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ABSTRACT
Objective: The main objective of the survey and 
inventory of laboratories was to identify laboratories 
storing Wild Polio Virus (WPV) or potential infectious 
materials as a last step in contributing to sub-regional 
efforts in attaining a polio free status and the eradication 
of poliomyelitis in Zambia.
Methods: An adapted WHO generic protocol was used 
by the National Task Force (NTF) on Poliovirus 
Containment in Zambia to identify all bio-medical 
laboratories in Zambia. A questionnaire sent to all 
biomedical laboratories was used to identify laboratories 
storing WPV or potential infectious materials. Further 
physical inspection was done on some laboratories.
Results: Of the 170 biomedical laboratories in Zambia, 
104 (61.1%) responded and 24 were identified as 
potentially storing infectious materials for WPV. Only 
one laboratory, the Virology Laboratory, University 
Teaching Hospital, Lusaka was noted to store both WPV 
and potential infectious materials.
Conclusion: The Ministry of Health through the NTF has 
set an impressive system in the laboratory containment of 
WPV and potential infectious materials in Zambia. 
Appropriate bio-safety containment and restricted access 
to stored materials containing WPV at the Virology 
Laboratory in Lusaka is a major step in the eradication of 
poliomyelitis in Zambia. Containment of these infectious 
materials will be particularly important in the post oral 
polio vaccination cessation era as there will be a large 
population of unimmunised children in the community 
who will be susceptible to polio. 
INTRODUCTION
 In May 1999, the World Health Assembly urged member 
states to begin the process leading to laboratory 
1containment of wild polio virus (WPV).  The Global 
Commission for the Certification of the Eradication of 
Poliomyelitis will declare the world polio free when all 
regions have documented the absence of wild poliovirus 
transmission for at least 3 consecutive years and when 
laboratories with wild poliovirus-containing materials 
2have implemented appropriate containment conditions.   
In October 2005, “Documentation for the Certification of 
Poliomyelitis Eradication for Zambia” was accepted by 
Africa Region Certification Committee (ARCC) of the 
3World Health Organisation.  Although Zambia is “polio 
free” the region is not polio free as some neighboring 
countries still have wild poliovirus transmission and 
therefore Zambia is at risk of wild poliovirus importation.  
The last documented cases of WPVs in Zambia were in 
4 1995. Over the past two years, transmission of indigenous 
WPV types 1 and 3 has continued in geographically 
limited areas in four countries namely Nigeria, India, 
5Pakistan and Afganistan.   Countries with low coverage of 
routine immunisation and rather weak health delivery 
systems in central Africa and the horn of Africa have also 
5been affected.   
Laboratory survey and inventory is referred to as Phase 1 
in the poliovirus containment, and describes the initial 
steps towards containment and covers the period when the 
number of polio-free countries and regions are 
2increasing.  The National Task Force (NTF) on Poliovirus 
Containment was constituted in 2002 by the Minister for 
Health with six members drawn from the Ministry of 
Health, Ministry of Tourism and Environment and 
Ministry of Science and Technology. The NTF was 
mandated to conduct laboratory survey and inventory of 
stored wild poliovirus-containing materials in Zambia. In 
order to meet the country requirements for the 
certification of regions as being polio free, the purpose of 
the survey was to identify all laboratories storing WPV or 
potential infectious materials. The specific objectives 
were to provide documentation of the location of 
laboratories retaining WPV or potential infectious 
materials and to create and maintain a current list of 
laboratories to be notified about initiating the appropriate 
containment procedures one year 
after detection of the last WPV. 
Reported here is the process of 
Phase 1 of poliovirus containment 
in Zambia.
METHODS
A WHO generic questionnaire for 
poliovirus containment and 
modified by the NTF was sent to 
all public and private laboratories 
in Zambia. The questionnaire included both aspects of 
laboratory survey and inventory for storage of WPV or 
potential infectious materials. 
These laboratories included those that had handled and 
sent stool specimens of children presenting with acute 
flaccid paralysis (AFP) to the National Polio Laboratory - 
Virology laboratory, University Teaching Hospital, 
Lusaka. All the data collected by questionnaire was 
entered into a computer database. Physical follow up 
visits by the NTF were made to some laboratories 
indentified on the inventory list as potentially storing 
infectious materials for WPV and others were randomly 
picked.
RESULTS
A total of 170 laboratories were identified in Zambia, and 
104 responded (61.1%) to the questionnaire. Of these 
respondents, 64.4% (67/104) were from the Ministry of 
Health, 3.8% (4/104) were from the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives, 1% (1/104) Ministry of 
Defence, 2% (2/104) Ministry of Education, 28.8% 
(30/104) were private laboratories, (Table 1).
Questionnaire  Type of laboratory       





Ministry of Health          67
Ministry of Education     2
Ministry of  Defence        1
Ministry of Agriculture   4
Private laboratories           30 
Sub –
 















Table 1: Total number of biomedical laboratories identified 
in Zambia
Table 2: Inventory of biomedical laboratories with WPV 
and potential infectious materials 
Of all the laboratories that responded, 23% (24/104) were 
noted to be potentially having stored materials containing 
wild polioviruses (Table 2). Those physically inspected 
by the NTF were 62.5% and the rest 37.5% are pending to 
be inspected (Table 2). Of note is that only one laboratory, 
The National Polio Laboratory, Virology Laboratory at 
the University Teaching Hospital, Lusaka has stored both 
wild polioviruses and potential infectious materials in 
oZambia and these are securely stored in minus 70 C 
freezers under lock and key. In addition, this facility is a 
BSL-2 containment laboratory. These wild poliovirus 
stored materials in this laboratory date back to 1992. 
DISCUSSION
Containment of infectious and potential infectious WPV 
materials after eradication is essential to minimise the 
risk for reintroducing WPV into poliomyelitis free 
communities. The staged containment approach begins 
with a national survey of all biomedical facilities, which 
alerts facilities to the need for containment, encourages 
reduction of WPV materials, and develops a national 
1,2inventory of facilities holding such materials (Phase 1).
In the near future, when WPV transmission is interrupted 
in the sub-region and indeed worldwide, laboratories 
Respondent Laboratories                                     Number  Percentage
Laboratories  possibly storing  WPV and 
potential infectious  materials  
Visited by NTF                 15
Pending Visit  by NTF 9




Visited Laboratories with confirmed 
WPV and potential  infectious materials  
 
                                     1 6.7% (1/15)






                                       
80 76.9% (80/104)
Total number of Respondent 
Laboratories
 
                                     
104
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holding WPV will represent the only remaining 
6repository of the virus  and maintaining the number of 
such facilities at a minimum and at an appropriate 
biosafety standard (laboratory containment) reduces the 
risk for a laboratory-associated reintroduction of WPV.  
Zambia has practically interrupted wild poliovirus 
transmission within its borders through high and 
sustained routine immunisation coverage with OPV 
given at birth, 6 weeks, 10 weeks and 14 weeks of age. 
Further, regular supplemental immunisation with OPV in 
children below 5 years has effectively interrupted the 
transmission of WPV.  With the efficient AFP 
surveillance system in Zambia, nearly all AFP cases are 
2identified and investigated.   
Of the 170 laboratories surveyed, 64.4% responded, table 
1. The response was better than that reported in Australia 
during an inventory for WPV and potential infectious 
materials in that country.  Only 22% of the laboratories 
7provided a final inventory despite follow up phone calls.  
Of the 24 laboratories identified as having potential 
infectious WPV only one facility, The National Polio 
Laboratory, Virology Laboratory at the University 
Teaching Hospital had stored both WPV infectious and 
potential infectious materials in the whole of Zambia 
(Table 2). All the stool specimens for AFP investigation 
from around Zambia are finally processed in this facility. 
There is paucity of data on the African continent or sub-
region on the containment of WPV and potential 
infectious materials.
Enhanced biosafety containment and restricted access to 
the stored materials containing wild poliovirus at the 
Virology Laboratory, University Teaching Hospital, 
Lusaka, is a major step in the eradication of poliomyelitis 
8in Zambia.  Appropriate biosafety measures are crucial 
for the prevention of poliovirus infection of laboratory 
workers and subsequent transmission to the community. 
In India, between 2000 and 2003, MEF-1 laboratory 
reference strain of poliovirus type 2 was isolated in ten 
9children with paralytic poliomyelitis.  The origin of the 
9 virus was some laboratory not identified.  This episode 
further highlights the urgent need for stringent 
containment of wild poliovirus and potential infectious 
materials in laboratories to prevent such incidences. 
Containment of such materials will become more crucial 
and probably more challenging in the post oral polio 
vaccination cessation era when there will be a large pool 
of unimmunised children in the community. This unique 
and impressive momentum set by the Ministry of Health 
through the NTF should be maintained to monitor and 
supervise the containment of WPV and potential 
infectious materials is commendable.  All the 
documentation will be readily available to the Africa 
Region Certification Committee of the World Health 
Organisation when declaring the sub-region polio free 
and not just Zambia.  
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